Here is the original article (in German).
China, including Hong Kong, is responsible for 80% of the sanctions circumvention against Russia, but denies any involvement.
This is stated in an internal report of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs […]
The document states that the EU sanctions have had a significant impact on the Russian economy, in particular by restricting exports of military goods through Armenia, Serbia, Uzbekistan and India. At the same time, problems persist with Kazakhstan, the UAE and Turkey, which do not provide complete data on export suspensions.
At the meeting, EU Sanctions Commissioner David O’Sullivan stressed that China, including Hong Kong, plays a key role in circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing denies any involvement in this. At the same time, the participation of EU companies in these schemes also weakens the European Commission’s position in negotiations with third countries.
The document also reports on the EU’s success in fighting Russia’s “shadow fleet”. O’Sullivan called for decisive action against the ports in Turkey, India and Malaysia that serve these vessels.
I have to respectfully disagree with that view.
First of all, the EU is a net exporter of electric cars. In 2024, the bloc exported 830,000 electric vehicles (+9 per cent year-on-year), while imports were at about 680,000 electric cars.
While imports from China remained steady in 2024 at more than 400 000 electric cars (60% of EU imports), the share of Chinese OEMs in imports from China grew to two-thirds in 2024, up from 50% in the previous year. The Chinese OEM Geely accounted for almost 40% of these imports, mainly through its brand Volvo Cars, according to statistics by the IEA.
Within the EU, sales of EVs by Chinese brands count for a small fraction of the total sales volume, with China’s BYD having sold ~7,000 in April 2025, for example (no 10 in the bloc), while market leader VW counts for ~200,000. If the EU would bloc Chinese EV imports, for example, it would hurt China extensively (supposedly more than the EU) as the Chinese economy could not sell its massive (and intentionally created) overcapacity. The EU doesn’t need Chinese EVs, but China needs the EU (and other foreign markets) if it wants to maintains its business model.
More importantly, however, there are very strong mutual dependencies between China and the West that have the potential to result in high economic costs for both sides in the event of a geopolitical conflict, may it be caused by Beijing’s ongoing support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, a possible Chinese attack against Taiwan, or other events.
The Western share of Chinese imports is certainly at very high levels for many very important key products such as semiconductors and some machinery.
But the West also accounts for a high share of China’s imports of other important goods, such as some foodstuffs, certain raw materials, and also some luxury products like perfume. If we look at China’s import/export ratios, we see it is 65:1 for ores, slag, and ash, and with an import share of almost 50 per cent the West holds a high leverage in this sector.
Chinese import/export ratios for mineral fuels is 8:1 (although the Western share is below 20 per cent here as the majority comes form emerging economies), for meat it is 36:1, for grain 21:1.
China is almost unilaterally dependent on aircraft and spacecraft machinery and parts thereof. Although the import/export ratio is quite low (2:1), the western share of Chinese imports is some 97 percent, according to the German Economic Institute (opens pdf – German source). This category displays China’s highest import dependency on the West, and there is practically no substitution by alternative trading partners and there appears to be only a small degree of substitutability possible through an expansion of domestic production.
[If interested, EU-China and other trade data with relevant links can be found here and using the Trading Economics data posted by @Saleh@feddit.org in this thread – and many other data bases, but make sure you look at the customs data, not China’s official statistics or something.]
So I don’t say that the EU or the West doesn’t depend on China, but I say that China depends also on the West if we look at the data of hilghly complex global supply chains. There are strong mutual dependencies.
This sounds impressive without anything that is existential for China. All commodities can be replaced if China pays a small premium for nonwestern sources while the rest of the world buys from western sources.
Airplane parts are inconvenient but China is starting to build their own aircrafts. If sanctions start, they will be able to create knockoffs for all necessary spare parts. But they also have a highspeed rail network, so they won’t be worried too much.
At this point in development, pressuring China will only accellerate the full independence of China. It would be Huawei on a national scale.
The dangerous part is that many former colonies won’t side with their former masters if they get the opportunity to break free.