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Cake day: May 9th, 2025

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  • There’s a few things to consider.

    On a theoretical level, Marx has already explained why exchange and use value diverge in a Capitalist economy. At national scales, it can be explained by numerous mechanisms, most notably Imperialism, unequal exchange, US Dollar hegemony, etc.

    But even on a technical level, there are caveats to be had.

    Firstly, the PPP basket, uses 2021 data released in 2024. A 5 year old basket that is then index linked forwards til 2026, after 2 major inflationary wars, will understandably affect results and accuracy massively. This precludes the worst of Germany’s energy crisis, China’s post-COVID response, and numerous other structural changes. This is a notable problem with fixed-weight indexes that introduces base drift after the benchmark year.

    The PPP conversion factor in non-survey years is extrapolated/interpolated by taking into account inflationary movements (the GDP deflator) between countries, by consequently linking it to changes in the US GDP deflator. Exchange rate does have a role technically here (by feeding into inflation during depreciation cycles for example), but in practice PPP is designed to net out exchange rate and inflation factors in the first place.

    Secondly, PPP as a concept is also dubious for gauging real in practice differences. There is not a globally applicable basket. This is something the ICP Programme acknlowedges, where there are regional lists of consumption baskets that is then combined to a global core. But this means in practice, someone in Germany won’t be spending 20% of their income on rent and 30% food, but a global list will have to weight it that way for cross-comparison. So the PPP basket is like a mean compositional average that no real individual country actually spends on but semi-useful for cross comparison.

    Thirdly, this all follows manipulating GDP data which relies on the System of National Accounts (SNA), which has it’s own sorts of failures and inadequacies from a Marxist standpoint.

    So all in all the data has some explanatory power but remains mired with the complexity of condensing all of human activity into one singular number.





  • Why Thailand must rethink growth strategy

    The government dreams of boosting GDP growth by transforming Thailand into a hub for high-tech, high value-added industries such as semiconductors, clean energy and, of course, data centres. However, there is a fundamental flaw in this glittering development strategy. The governor of the Bank of Thailand has acknowledged that the benefits of such industries would accrue mainly to foreign investors, who own both the capital and the technology.

    By my estimate, fewer than 500,000 Thai workers would be employed in these new industries — just 1.2% of the country’s 42.4 million-strong workforce. What, then, will become of the remaining 98.8% and their families? Will they simply rely on government handouts?

    In my view, that is not a sensible development strategy. For an upper-middle-income economy, any development model should benefit at least half the workforce. Rather than pursuing entirely new high-tech industries, Thailand may be better served by strengthening existing industries that already have high employment potential.

    I spent weeks trying to identify the best path forward for Thailand, taking into account its ageing population, widening income gap, weak education system, limited capital and mounting debt burden. I came to the conclusion that the country’s priority should not be maximising GDP growth through an export-led economy, but preserving jobs and narrowing income inequality through import substitution.

    Even the mainstream Economists have started to say it.

    Thailand and also the Philippines, in Southeast Asia, both face Latin American style economic structures. ISI is not enough. Their own history elucidates but examples in Brazil, Chile or Mexico further corroborates why ISI is not enough. If you don’t sort out the productive structure, you get cycles of civilian-military government, of dynastic “right-wing” and “left-wing” political capture.

    You need a rupture. You need to do more.

    Perhaps the Marxist literature on the agrarian and urban question can help Thailand solve their predicament? Even other heterodox perspectives and studies on the Asian developmental experience will prove to be useful.


  • For anyone who wants more details on the VC-funded Tech-Zionist cult of “the Network State”, I recommend vcinfodocs.com.

    epilogue

    Barbarians at the gate

    Malaysia is not a playground for billionaire tech-cults, nor is it a colony to be bullied by foreign congressmen

    It was a frontline border skirmish against a new, insidious breed of borderless invaders. For months, a collection of hyper-privileged, sovereignty-defying tech-oligarchs quietly established a physical beachhead on our shores.

    His whole shtick in Forest City was seizing the rubble after the collapse of Country Garden and China’s property deleveraging, and reviving it through paid Western Spectacles on social media and charging overpriced rents to even more clueless Westerners. Ironically Forest City was mainly pushed through the state government and Country Garden and then the federal took the mantle to realise it.

    Like I said before, in Malaysia - Johor state, where Forest City is located, has perhaps the strongest state identity. The sultan has their own separate army and perhaps one of the few state monarchs that regularly antagonises the federal government. SEZ/SFZ notwithstanding, if not the federal government it is the state that will have to contend with a fallout. The state monarch and minister has had to deal with the consequences of Forest City’s collapse and they had to be responsible for anything after.

    The state has just passed through elections, with federal elections also just potentially around the corner. Demanding an audience with the PM when every parliamentary party is itching to announce betrayal and exclaim their own authentic “anti-Zionist” brand is a no-go. Now the state coalition, BN, and state royalty, also have to respond because it was under their leadership this was allowed to fester.

    To think that Balaji and his ilk can establish a foothold for an archipelago of small enclaves in The Archipelago that has already seen it gone through once already.

    Now the state and federal government is practically engaging in lawfare against the school.

    Network School premises closed, signboards taken down or covered

    MDEC Takes Immediate Action To Revoke Malaysia Digital Status of Network School Operator

    So now every part of the hierarchy wants to wash their hands from this, from the city council, the state monarchy, state minister, members of the Prime Minister’s cabinet, and the PM himself.

    To summarize:

    Something happened while the tech Zionists and their lapdogs screamed about holy war and Jew hunts: The local council simply padlocked Network School for not having a licence to operate.

    The tech invasion was closed for contravening zoning laws.

    Or to quote WSJ’s heading:

    A Tech Founder Wanted to Start a New Country. An Actual Country Got in the Way.

    funny quote

    Srinivasan, 46, grew up on Long Island the son of Indian immigrant physicians. He once said he was bullied at school as “the only brown kid among hundreds of people”—and then unfairly punished for physically defending himself. “I learned early on that you’ve got to stand up for yourself, that the fix is in.…The state is against you.”

    The US diaspora really need to stop acting out their own unresolved trauma onto the Global South. It’s getting a little ridiculous.

    And here comes the downwardly mobile white commentariat living in tourist spots because they are a complete leech in their home and host countries:

    The closure of Network School: Another blow to Malaysia’s innovation ecosystem?

    Real innovation does not emerge from hardware or policy slogans. It arises from creative individuals who connect dots, challenge assumptions, and build new business models, products, and platforms that generate fresh sources of economic value.

    “Innovation ecosystem” = let “creative individuals… connect dots”. Fucking hell. No wonder Australia is in the dumpster.

    Network School was precisely such a platform as an incubator designed to nurture bold ideas and translate them into scalable ventures capable of competing regionally and globally.

    This is not just a local loss. It risks deterring high-tech investors and the growing global community of digital nomads, estimated at 30–35 million and expanding rapidly.

    numbers don’t care about vibes bro.

    Malaysia has the highest number of total IPOs and by value in Southeast Asia in 2025, and as of H1 2026. Malaysia has consistently ranked the highest in UN WIPO’s Global Innovation Index, only 2nd below China, in the upper-middle income bracket. The GII is quite silly in many of it’s included indicators, but regardless, individual indicators, like R&D to GDP, or patents/publications per capita, are all still above regional averages.

    Just accept that a Global South country is doing capitalism better than you.

    brain drain statement

    Meanwhile, expatriate Malaysians run thriving businesses in Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, the US, and Europe, demonstrating daily the talent pool the country is haemorrhaging. Just look at the current brain drain going on.

    ~7.5% of the Malaysian citizen population are abroad. And more than two-thirds are in Singapore, which is hardly some foreign land. It’s right there (and if we see the cross flow, 2.2% of Singaporean citizen pop are in Malaysia, while 5% Malaysian citizen pop are in Singapore). So removing Singapore from the equation, Malaysia actually has a relatively low (2.5%) diaspora, below global mean and median, and absolute smaller diaspora (700k) than literally every other major populated Southeast Asian country.

    Why the special treatment of Malaysians in Singapore? Even outside the fact that it used to be part of the country, and that the statistics also counts former Malaysians during the secession, it’s also that it’s a city-state that acts more like a city with visa controls economics-wise than a fully separate economic entity. I personally would classify it as more like internal rural-urban migration than full separation. Like Hong Kong-Guangdong, or the Hukou system.

    Also this all assumes that any citizen abroad is automatically the best and brightest which is not the case. It is disproportionate, but aggregate figures hide this. Other data, like 50% of Malaysians in Singapore being in high-skilled jobs, doesn’t suggest any “extreme” brain drain, because the numbers are still too small to matter, when the tertiary education system outputs 300,000 graduates a year.

    Thus the significance of the “brain drain” to the macroeconomy is negligible. It’s a numbers game that these people continuously fail at. Enough with “human capital” and “institutions”, only to peddle individualist nonsense and market gospel. Go back to learning statistics and economic history. These people badly need it.

    And even if we disregard all that; the premise is still all wrong because Singapore didn’t become innovative and attract Malaysians because they let people “solve problems” - whatever that means. The structural reason remains higher wages. If wages in Johor can grow to even somewhat match Singapore wages then this whole brain drain nonsense will be solved.

    Tweet

    One of the biggest, most persistent myths in Africa and the Global South is that all we desperately need is more “practical” manual work in universities to magically build an army of engineers and industrialize overnight. Ironically, Western nations and foreign NGOs actively fuel, finance, and maintain this myth across the continent by constantly sponsoring science fairs, innovation competitions, and student hackathons to praise superficial talent.

    This is fundamentally, historically false. Industrialization is always a top-down, state-directed, and heavily capitalized strategic effort. It is not a collection of bottom-up, amateurish science fair projects. No nation in human history has ever industrialized simply because university students started building water pumps, solar lanterns, or tricycles out of scrap metal, because without state direction, public procurement, and massive industrial credit, those prototypes remain cheap gimmicks that can never scale.

    Brain drain at best is a symptom not a cause. And unironically the best solution is something that these people would decry - enact barriers and high costs for emigration. Strict visa policies. But these people would never suggest these things.

    Too busy putting their nose in other people’s business, the government has sent warrants against the guy. Too scared to risk his teeth, he lives in Bangkok, the capital of slimy white guys whose level of irrelevance and incompetence is only matched by their arrogance.


  • Malaysia’s reliance on GLCs weighs on productivity, says OECD

    KUALA LUMPUR (July 28): Malaysia’s continued reliance on government-linked companies (GLCs) and government-linked investment companies (GLICs) in strategic sectors has created an uneven playing field for private firms, hindering competition and weighing on productivity, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) said.

    The OECD attributed the prominence of GLCs to the legacy of the New Economic Policy, which sought to empower the Bumiputera community but had also entrenched the presence of state-linked firms in strategic industries, often at the expense of private sector participation.

    It urged Malaysia to ensure state-owned enterprises compete on equal terms with private firms, saying this would help foster a more dynamic and competitive business environment.

    Why should Malaysia, a country that averaged 4.5% GDP growth since 2000, take advice from a club that averaged 1.9% GDP growth? The country’s private GFCF has increased by more than 50% since 2015, while public investment has remained stagnant as per the national accounts. Can the OECD explain where “crowding out” has occurred? Need to look at specific sectoral analysis instead of these vague assertions seen in their survey.

    An interesting database I was looking through recently: pre-tax income inequality in Malaysia is now lower than Germany according to the World Inequality Database. When not too long ago Malaysia was equivalent to Argentina. Pre-tax and Post-tax Income Gini Index has dropped since 2000 while simultaneously maintaining higher GDPpc growth - which OECD member can say the same?

    Malaysia prioritises wage growth over GST return

    Economy Minister Akmal Nasrullah Mohd Nasir said Malaysia will prioritise raising wages and expanding the tax base before considering a goods and services tax (GST) return, following the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) recommendation for a broader consumption tax.

    Akmal said only about 15% of Malaysia’s workforce currently pays income tax, underscoring the need to address the country’s structural wage issues before introducing broader taxes that could weigh on household consumption.

    “While we respect the view from OECD, at the same time, I think what’s more important is how to broaden our tax income,” he said during a press conference after the launch of the latest OECD Economic Survey of Malaysia on Tuesday. “Without the higher pay or better wages, then whatever tax that we introduce may have some repercussions in terms of what people consume or what people earn.”

    Politely asking the OECD to fuck off.



  • Southeast Asia’s Real Decolonization Is Only Beginning Now, Driven by China’s Rise

    Full article in link.

    (Yicai) July 15 – A new stage in the decolonization in Southeast Asia began recently, triggered not by politics but by the transformative regional growth driven by China’s phenomenal rise, according to the executive director of Penang Institute, one of Malaysia’s major public policy think tanks.

    “The broad shift in global economic productivity to East Asia has redrawn supply chains into a tight network in the region,” Dr Ooi Kee Beng said in a recent interview with Yicai…

    …The sudden tremendous influx of capital from a growing neighbouring big power should not be seen so much as a threat to be managed as a tidal force exposing how little the region was ever truly its own master even after colonialism, according to Ooi. The biggest misconception outsiders have about modern Southeast Asia after the world war, or during the Cold War, has been that it is a coherent geopolitical region. The region is better understood as one that is defined from without rather than from within by some centripetal force. The historical fact is that the region was very much cut into bits in recent centuries, and its economic and socio-economic connections from pre-colonial times were badly broken.

    Although archipelagic, the region had more significant ties between islands and between coastlines and between East and Southeast Asia in pre-colonial times than in the postcolonial era.

    In the new era of nation states and with national borders imitating colonial borders, people in the region did not really travel much between these new countries. Their modern orientation continued to veer towards their respective colonial metropolises. Only with budget airlines since 2009 and with ASEAN’s open skies initiative were ordinary Southeast Asians able to get to know each other’s countries more seriously through cheap and constant flights.

    Ooi pointed out: “We began getting to know each other again only quite recently, at the people level.”

    …Real cross-cultural interactions occur at street level: “If I sit down with you for a meal and eat your food, I begin to feel that I know you,” he said, adding that China’s visa-free policy for several Southeast Asian nations is wonderful for regional socialisation. “You don’t have to do much. Let people mix, and they will get to know each other and learn about each other.”

    Regionalizing Nationalism

    The real decolonization of Southeast Asia is only beginning. Each former colony may have won independence, but each stays strongly wired to its old metropole, such as Indonesia to the Dutch, and Malaysia and Singapore to London. These newly independent countries are barely comfortable in each other’s presence, ASEAN or not, Ooi noted. It is the recent rise of a regional great power that finally forces them to consider why they have been relating so weakly to their immediate neighbours and so strongly to their former masters, he said.

    He claimed that there is a necessity to “regionalize nationalism—in the region and anywhere else.”

    Smaller countries on the Belt and Road need to be more proactive within a historical understanding of their own situation and to act accordingly, and not just wait passively for bigger powers like Beijing to design everything from the top down with its own interests in mind, he said.

    What he calls “Little BRIs” can feature smaller countries getting together, cognizant of giant regional-spanning projects being planned, to develop on their own terms their input and participation in them. This is clearly a possibility where continental speedy rail systems are concerned. Other areas would include maritime logistics, merchant shipping, and security links where the region’s own states could exercise more control.

    Countries that keep thinking of themselves as small and passive—as victims of history and of size—risk locking themselves into staying that way, Ooi claimed.

    The view from Penang, in the end, is not about choosing between China and the United States but about how regional discourses are formulated for accepting differences rather than ranking them, Ooi stressed. The global economic and political wave reshaping the region’s factories and ports, and its worries and hopes, is less a tsunami than a long-postponed invitation to a conversation the region writ large has never quite had with itself, he said.


  • Almost $1 Billion Later, the US Still Can’t Make a Medical Glove (archive link)

    A bit of low effort commentary but seeing the US fail at making an industry that my country specialises in despite being hegemon is quite funny and I will make fun of it.

    A dark gray building full of steel tanks and giant reactors sits at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Southern Virginia, a hulking symbol of an abandoned effort to make more medical gloves in the US.

    With $123 million in financing from the federal government, the factory was to have been the first in the nation in more than 30 years to produce a key ingredient in the gloves used in exam rooms and hospitals across the country. Now, four-and-a-half years after breaking ground, the Blue Star NBR factory may be a month away from being sold for parts.

    “I’m out of money,” said Scott Maier, Blue Star’s chief executive officer. “I’ve got nothing left to mortgage.”

    The plan to kickstart production began in 2020. As the Covid pandemic exposed the lack of American manufacturing mettle in personal protective gear, the first Trump administration decided to bolster domestic glove-making capacity. The government under President Joe Biden kept the effort going, financing six companies with $850 million.

    Instead of seeding an industry that could reduce dependence on imports, the money doled out left a trail of empty factories. None of the companies is making medical gloves. Almost all still come from abroad, most from Malaysia, with the critical raw material supplied mainly by China.

    Okay that’s a lie. Malaysia imports 64% of the raw materials for NBL. The imports mainly comes from South Korea according to this commodity business analysis:

    Malaysia depends on imports for 64% of its NBL requirement, mostly from South Korea, ICIS analyst Lina Xu said. South Korea’s NBL production, in turn, is dependent primarily on the Middle East for supply of key raw materials BD and ACN.

    …Malaysia, which supplies about 45% of global demand for rubber gloves, is a major supplier of essential personal protective equipment (PPE) to global healthcare systems, according to the Malaysian Rubber Glove Manufacturers Association (MARGMA).

    Even now the cope is that China deindustrialises the US when it’s just blowback.

    Sorry folks the free market says that Malaysia and China has a comparative advantage in gloves.

    read more

    In the end, the glove endeavor showed how difficult it can be to revive US manufacturing, said Prashant Yadav, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations.

    “It is frustrating to watch because value chains for any medical product take a while to establish and take root,” Yadav said. “Any back and forth on an earnest attempt to relocate some portion, or a significant portion, of the value chain — it just erodes credibility in future initiatives.”

    Reduce government and corporate bureaucracy. The US has too many rent-seekers. I think more austerity against the ruling classes are needed.

    Nitrile gloves, as they’re called, are vital in healthcare, protecting patients and practitioners from infection and contamination. Only about 1% of those used in the US are made domestically, in part because medical-grade nitrile butadiene rubber isn’t produced anywhere in the country. The deficiency was highlighted when the Iran war sent petrochemical costs soaring, threatening the foreign medical glove industry and creating shortage risks.

    Blue Star received the $123 million under a contract awarded in 2021. Maier said that just wasn’t enough to finish the project after construction costs soared during the pandemic. Other glove-contract recipients either never got going or ceased operations and laid off workers when they couldn’t find buyers. One roadblock: a pair of domestic gloves can cost twice as much as an import from a country with far lower labor and other costs. The difference is pennies, but for a hospital system that purchases millions, it adds up fast.

    Americans need to accept the managed decline of high(er) costs and low(er) standard of living. That’s what the Global South has suffered for centuries.

    While the glove plan was initiated during Trump’s first presidency, the contracts were awarded after Biden took office in 2021. The current administration’s view is that the program failed because of investments during Biden’s term that didn’t meet expectations, according to a person familiar with the thinking who wasn’t authorized to speak publicly and asked not to be identified.

    Tim Manning, the White House Covid-19 supply coordinator under Biden, has a different take. “The truth is, the Trump administration did begin a number of these projects. Those contractors, those manufacturers were identified in the waning days of the Trump administration and we took them over.”

    The companies’ appeals for more money after the initial contracts went out gained little traction. The current administration has decided not to put any more money into those businesses, according to the person familiar with policymakers’ thinking.

    Instead, it’s rolling out another plan to benefit the few US companies that make nitrile gloves with imported NBR, and didn’t participate in the program. New procurement rules will ensure that federal agencies buy the gloves domestically, a spokesperson for the White House Office of Management and Budget said. “All nitrile gloves purchased by the US government will soon be made in America.”

    Wtf - public procurement? Can we get WTO on this unfair non-tariff barrier to free trade?

    That would be a welcome development at US Paper Mill Co., a paper mill-turned glove factory in Chillicothe, Ohio. It employs about 150 people and sells under a licensing agreement with US Medical Glove Co.

    “If the federal government were to make continuous orders of gloves from this plant instead of China and Malaysia, US Paper Mill could hire more workers,” said Dan Williamson, a spokesperson for the plant, which uses NBR from South Korea and India.

    The US goes through some 120 billion nitrile gloves each year. About 30% are used in the medical field and the rest by such industries as food service, auto repair and pharmaceutical production. The government buys around 2 billion annually for federal healthcare professionals, food-service workers in jails and security personnel in airports, among others

    While the Malaysian manufacturers get most of their NBR from China, the world’s leading maker of the material, the few US nitrile glove makers must source it elsewhere if they want to do business with federal agencies.

    American Armor Gloves in West Columbia, South Carolina, acquires NBR from Italy and South Korea. Dan Adams, the owner, said in May that his factory churns out about 100 million a month and recently struggled to keep up with orders. That’s because the shortage threat linked to the Iran war spurred buyers to scour for new suppliers to bolster stock they had on hand.

    “We’re getting calls from all over the country,” Adams said then, saying American Armor heard from hospitals, the military and more. “They’re asking if we have supply.”

    According to the OMB spokesperson, the Trump administration believes the new government purchasing plan may lead to a domestic NBR industry down the road.

    It’s unlikely to be soon enough for the Blue Star factory, a few miles off Interstate 81 near Wytheville, Virginia, next to railroad tracks in a sparsely populated industrial center. Nothing in the building is operational. The 2,500 jobs Blue Star was to have created in the town of just over 8,000 people never materialized.

    Maier said he pulled $10 million from two other small businesses he owns to try to get the plant going. He said he was dedicated to the effort. “This is a critical piece of infrastructure that the country needs,” he said. “You can’t just buy equipment from China and plug it in.”

    It’s no easy task to make NBR, a blend of the colorless, petroleum-based butadiene and the chemical acrylonitrile. The plan was for the two to be brought in by rail, mixed and transferred to reactors where the combo would be blasted with heat for 11 hours. After that, the mixture would make its way to a blowdown vessel to be cooled and stripped of unwanted materials. From there, the finished NBR would head to five six-story-tall silos outside, to await transport by truck to manufacturers.

    Each of the reactors at Blue Star cost more than $500,000 and getting them up and running would take another $70 million, Maier said. He persuaded the Department of Heath and Human Services last August to provide an additional $10 million, but said that didn’t come close to filling the gap.

    Standing outside the factory, he said he may need to sell the reactors and other equipment, likely to an NBR maker in China. “I don’t want to sell,” he said, “Seeing taxpayer dollars get sold off for bits and pieces, every bone in my body does not want to do that.”

    You can print more tax dollars buddy. But you can’t print out an industrial ecosystem. Sad.


  • @oliveoil@hexbear.net

    I’ll respond here to address both points.

    There’s roughly 2 factions that are opposed to the current military-royal bureaucracy and associated agribusiness and rentier capital, an urban elite comprised of the middle classes and the haute bourgeoisie, and the rural masses, mainly semi-proletarians, farmers and migrants (Laotian/Cambodian/Burmese).

    The history of Thailand is a case of FDI enclave development and as such of severe spatial uneven development, in which urbanization remains prohibited through feudal-like debt and social structures in the countryside. This is why only 45% of the population are still rural.

    There is definitely evidence of proper NED and other CIA infiltrations, especially for Orange supporters (Move Forward Party), but due to their concentrated class allegiance mainly in Bangkok, I don’t personally see a way in which the comprador faction especially can sustain enough of a base to control the entire country. Basically they are idealists and are too incompetent and insulated in their bubble to manage the ongoing contradictions and seize power.

    The current greatest risk is that of the ancien regime - the royal-military bureaucracy and rentier Capital. You can look at the statistics yourself, the state does not benefit the masses in anyway. It is the state that has shot and suppressed communists, and killed and disappeared protestors, especially of the mainly rural-based red shirt movement. It is the state that has lead to stagnant wages for 3 decades, mass debt slavery and led the country to be a foreign playground for Western tourists. It is the current administration and classes that allowed US airplanes to refuel and bomb Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. It is the current ruling class that joined SEATO.

    I’ll name one more statistic: electricity generation. Vietnam now generates more electricity per capita than Thailand. Why? Because the Thai state does not benefit from mass infrastructure like electrification. Electricity generation in the country has been nearly stagnant for a decade - despite less than 40% of the population having air conditioning.

    China’s rise complicates the picture of course, and Thailand does have a relatively strategic geography, but that can be said for any state neighbouring the South China Sea. This has lead to a more accommodative stance by the country to China as anyone competent enough will no who holds the cards now. But current BRI buildouts to the North and South of Thailand implictly understands that despite the central location of Thailand in Mainland Southeast Asia - it is not that important. In practice, the US will struggle to leverage any gains when every other state will retain a Pro-China posture (Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, various Burmese factions, Laos and Cambodia). Chinese investments are growing in Thailand, but it has other avenues to secure and bypass the maritime chokepoints - and that also implies that somehow China won’t just wipe the floor with the US navy in it’s local and home waters.

    The USA will no doubt try to install a friendlier regime, but it’s reach is limited by the very nature of the political economy of Thailand. It is heavily decentralized, mired with internal factions and spatial heterogeneity. It isn’t centralised like South Korea or Japan. One has to do the painstaking case of how the current reality will become worse than it already is and list out how (concretely) a “colour revolution” would take place, ie the factions, the social base, the means, etc.

    Of course this isn’t team sports, and reality will reveal itself accordingly. I myself am confident that if the oppressed classes continue to exist in the current state, there is more likely a shift to a truly anti-imperialist and materially progressive movement than there is to a comprador client state. I do have that optimism.




  • Review of International Political Economy

    Economic nationalism as a quest for liberation: the anti-colonial roots of Indonesian IPE and their persistence

    ABSTRACT

    This article revisits economic nationalism through the lens of postcolonial political thought, examining its role not simply as a developmental strategy but as a liberatory project grounded in anti-colonial struggle. Focusing on the Indonesian case, it foregrounds the contributions of three foundational thinkers, Sukarno, Tan Malaka, and Hatta, whose political-economic visions articulated distinct yet interconnected understandings of economic nationalism. Sukarno positioned economic nationalism within a global anti-imperialist movement centered on solidarity among the oppressed and the transformation of racialized hierarchies. Tan Malaka framed economic sovereignty as inseparable from revolutionary struggle, advancing ekonomi berjuang (struggling economy) as a means of achieving national control over production and resources. Hatta promoted ekonomi kerakyatan (people’s economy) as a model of domestic reconstruction grounded in cooperative development and cultural practices of mutual aid. Situating these thinkers alongside cognate post- and anti-colonial traditions in International Political Economy (IPE), particularly W.E.B. Du Bois’ analysis of the global color line and Samir Amin’s concept of delinking, the article shows how Indonesian thought articulated themes that resonate strongly with contemporary decolonial IPE. It further demonstrates how these intellectual traditions continue to inform contemporary policies, including nickel downstreaming and the promotion of the Islamic economy.

    A choice paragraph:

    Sukarno viewed the international system as racially hierarchical, shaped by imperial domination and colonial legacies. He saw Western hegemony as perpetuating a structurally unequal global order and called for a ‘Revolution of Humankind’ to transform it. His vision combined moral urgency with political strategy, grounded in Third World solidarity and the assertion of political equality through multilateralism. Tan Malaka offered a far more radical critique. He conceptualized the international order as an extension of colonial capitalism, where global structures reproduced the economic subjugation of the South. His worldview was rooted in Marxism and anti-imperialism, calling for revolutionary change through transnational alliances of oppressed peoples, especially via Pan-Islamist and communist networks (Ng, 2021). Hatta, however, adopted a more accommodative approach to the international system. While he acknowledged global inequalities, he prioritized dialogue and mutual accommodation between the North and South, characterized by mutual respect and to the benefit of the Indonesian people (Hatta 1953). For Hatta, internationalism was about peaceful cooperation that safeguarded national sovereignty.

    if anyone wants the article since it isn’t open access, suggest a website that I can upload the file on and ill update the post.


  • The issue isn’t only fertilizers at the farm-level. It’s that the entire current food-system and supply chain is based heavily on petroleum and the derivatives.

    [Source]:

    Some examples of off-farm energy consumption in the food system include:

    Processing. In the United States, heating (59%) and cooling (16%) for preservation and storage are the two major consumers of energy in food processing (Corigliano and Algieri, 2024).

    Transportation. Globally, transport accounts for around 19% of food system greenhouse gas emissions (Li et al., 2022). This can be considered as a proxy for energy use. This supports the distribution of an estimated 22.2 trillion tonne kilometers (tkm – a tkm is the movement of one tonne of goods one kilometer) of food produce per year.

    Packaging. Plastic is responsible for more than 10% of total life cycle energy for the majority of the 30 food products surveyed by Kan and Miller (2022) whilst for seven foods (raspberries, blueberries, strawberries, carbonated drinks, almond milk, olive oil, and bottled water), plastic packaging is responsible for 20% of total energy use. Plastics are predominantly derived from the byproducts of refining petroleum and natural gas.

    In a review of global datasets, Rasul et al in Energy input and food output: The energy imbalance across regional agrifood systems, that agro-food systems in the West, namely Europe, North America and Australia, have EROEI (Energy Return on Energy Input) is below 0. That means more energy is needed to be put in then we get out.

    This compares to most Asian agro-food systems, who have values larger than 1, due to numerous reasons of course, which includes still the present heavy labour-intensive agricultural activity, lower meat and animal byproduct consumption, and higher consumption of local produce, but the obvious being the longer frost-free periods and higher bioproductivity found in the tropics due to higher evapotranspiration rates and accelerated cycles.

    So the absolute irony is of course that right now most of Europe and the US is decrying of inefficient industrial subsidies in China that “distorts markets”, but the collective West has the most inefficient subsidy programme on Earth: their agriculture industry.

    This corroborate what Patnaik and Patnaik pointed out in their book Theory of Imperialism, in which food production despite technological (or perhaps because of) is still heavily dependent on the Tropics due to simple Geography, refuting David Harvey’s weak refutes on environmental determinism. Western’s strangling of global South economies is literally starving the world. Perpetual underdevelopment of the Global South will lead to continual Global food scarcity and insecurity.

    Global South agriculture, even at it’s excess, still is a net producer of energy - it produces more than it consumes, particularly in Africa and Asia, and it is continuously increasing this net surplus (I suspect is mostly due to China’s innovations and some level of industrialization and advancements in technology that has occurred throughout the continent).

    So besides what certain Western based NGOs argue, there is still a deep question on not only redistribution of current existing food resources, but also there is still a need in building the technological and knowledge-base for which a truly sustainable food system can take place, which the Global South desperately needs.



  • South-east Asian economies struggle to counter energy shock

    The funny bit here is the article as per usual only focuses on monetary policy as means to control inflation but the reality is the government can still do a lot more in a crisis situation. In fact, it is in a crisis situation that enables governments to enact more radical measures they otherwise would not be able to.

    Take Malaysia’s case - right now there’s a debate in the UK about price caps in supermarkets. Malaysia has had price controls since 1970s and has now expanded to include many essential goods. Furthermore, the government has invested in supply-side interventions, through fuel and fertiliser subsidies and improving agricultural production through automation. Consumption subsidies through cash handouts have also been routinely employed. The government has also re-introduced an intiative of a previous administration of government-run grocery stores (although a bit liberalized now with PPP initiatives) and food markets. Not to say everything’s perfect, but the government can obviously do a lot.

    In fact the deputy minister of Economy recently talked about how fuel subsidies are being used as a demand management mechanism.

    So despite Malaysia’s high exposure through global trade flows, increasing risk premiums in maritime shipping and the obvious supply shock, the government has took a lot of measures to make it more or less manageable at the point of impact to people as seen in the CPI, with the most notable part of the basket impacted being logistics and fuel.

    Medium to long term a hypothetical country should obviously focus on investments in electrification and pursuing renewable, nuclear and alternative fuel sources (biofuels namely). Again in Malaysia’s case this is done through mobilising the massive GLCs and GLICs and other state-linked corporations like the national energy company Tenaga Nasional or integrated O&G operator Petronas.

    So in the UK’s case it means nationalizing every strategic enterprise and of course government spending (in production) but it remains to be seen if the UK will be able to move beyond it’s imperial hangover of 50+ years and actually start recognising present realities.


  • Asian Boss - Why Singaporeans Are Fleeing to Malaysia every Weekend

    Overall the video does give vital information on certain dynamics of JB-Singapore, but it fails to see the larger view beyond just border security and housing. Or rather, it does not emphasise what makes the dynamics now different from decades ago. Anyone can easily say that JB and SG are from two different worlds, the question now is what makes current conditions different.

    It reflects a structural reality in which headline numbers simply does not give it justice. There is in fact convergence of the economic trajectories of Malaysia’s southern tip and Singapore. Anyone who knows the history would know that this was what the historical Left wanted but couldn’t actually put into practice. Because Singapore’s position in the Straits Settlements, the crown colony trade entrepot had material relations vastly different to the Malayan hinterlands, which were characterised by owner-middlemen-plantation worker and feudal-peasant-village dynamics as opposed to the metropolitan, colonizer-worker-capitalist struggles in Singapore. But in the new Century, economics is again the final decider, and what may finally unite the two countries.

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    The JS Special Economic Zone, the first SEZ comprising 2 separate countries, is the ruling classes solution to resolve the economic malaise facing both nations. The matter is that Johor has lived in Singapore shadow for the past half century - a reversal of the historical developments in which the Johor sultanate was always one of the richest and most powerful states across the Malay Peninsula. This is why Johor was explicitly allowed in the constitution to keep it’s own separate army during the formation of the federation. Singapore’s further rise corrupted these dynamics and projected a strong gravitational effect in the economy of Johor.

    But as the last 30 years proceeded, Singapore’s full development of the island and continuous ongoing land reclamation projects faced a material reality: land is scarce. The economy has run too large and has lead to a breaking down of the tripartite social contract of the state, business and workers, where increasing land rents although very beneficial to government coffers, has also lead to considerable asset appreciation of the country’s HDB flats, which simultaneously benefits Singapore’s 90% home-owning population while making it harder for the houseless youth to obtain. The country has also realised, as much as it can invest in food security, it simply does not have the water or land for vast industrial agriculture to feed it’s population. Integration ensures that vital supply chains of energy, food, water and land remains accessible for Singaporeans in a fracturing global environment.

    For Johor, the SEZ is to attract capital investments to ultimately stem (or atleast ease) the flow of Johoreans from migrating to Singapore for work, whether permanently or the daily commutes through the causeway. The state’s close proximity to Singapore distorts cost of living and inflation pressures, leading to the state facing both the highest living and property costs in the country despite near-average wage levels. It is also to bolster the industrial clusters formed in the state in the past few decades by both scaling up through the aforementioned investments, but also through linking with Singapore’s vast network and corporate prestige.

    The explosion of data centres, the building of the Pengerang fully integrated petrochemical complex, further investments in industrial agriculture, health and aerospace manufacturing, is the state’s plan to stop living in Singapore’s shadow by enabling (high-paying) jobs. Obviously the success of the initiative is one thing, and whether it can also provide high-paying jobs is another big one, but the institutional support and enthusiasm seen from both sides of the causeway reflects the political will from the ruling classes.

    One thing is for sure, Singapore’s social stability hedges upon PAP fulfilling the social contract of providing social housing (that guarantees long-term wealth) for a youth that sees it desperately escaping from their grasp. Public support of the SEZ in Johor correspondingly is thus dependent on resolving longstanding issues of cost of living and jobs. Perhaps if Singapore and Malaysia is able to both simplify movement across the border while simultaneously managing migration and cost pressures, both countries come out better. That is the gamble both sides are playing.