"We can’t simply wait and assume that a potential Russian attack won't come before 2029," German intelligence chief Martin Jaeger said. "We’re already under fire today."
The Russian thirst for poorly trained conscripts cannot be adequately explained by corruption and poor reporting obscuring what’s actually happening. At some point you have to accept the possibility that Putin knows what’s happening and is ok with it.
Sure, it’s possible that Russia hasn’t changed its doctrine in 3 years, but it seems unlikely. Old doctrine is obsolete on a battlefield where all movements are immediately observed and armoured vehicles are more vulnerable due to a proliferation of anti tank weapons.
But throwing cannon fodder at the guns to reveal where they are, then shooting them with something else - that never stops working as long as you have cannon fodder.
I wonder if we’re just arguing over whether this strategy is something deserving of praise, with you thinking that, since I characterise the balance favouring Russia, I think this is strategic genius? In case of that, I don’t; it’s stupid and wasteful. But it’s also working in the sense that it’s gradually pushing Ukraine back.
The Russian thirst for poorly trained conscripts cannot be adequately explained by corruption and poor reporting obscuring what’s actually happening.
I’m really not sure why you feel this needs any further explanation. I’ve already covered how their doctrine is failing them, and it’s resulting in troops being pushed into the meat grinder instead. If you’re confused on some particular point, maybe try asking questions instead.
But throwing cannon fodder at the guns to reveal where they are, then shooting them with something else - that never stops working as long as you have cannon fodder.
75% of battlefield kills in Ukraine are made by explosive equipped FPV suicide drones. These can attack from any position and angle, and can loiter in an area for a long time, so the notion that they’re revealing the position of enemy guns with these attacks does not hold up to the reality on the battlefield. It may be the belief of some of the commanders that that’s what they’re doing, but if so, they’re wrong.
But it’s also working in the sense that it’s gradually pushing Ukraine back.
I covered this in my first reply in this conversation. If you’re going to repeat arguments that I’ve already countered, without offering any additional counterargument or support for your claim, then I might as well try to have a debate about quantum physics with a toddler.
I covered this in my first reply in this conversation.
What you specifically said was “It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear” but then ignored the fact that Russia seems extremely willing to bear the cost it is paying.
75% of battlefield kills in Ukraine are made by explosive equipped FPV suicide drones.
Most FPV drone kills are not first strikes against moving troops. They are more often used to to prevent recovery of a disabled vehicle or to finish off someone who’s wounded. There is a first-hand account of this here but if you’re following the war and think back to videos you’ve seen of FPV kills you’ll probably recognise this.
I’m really not sure why you feel this needs any further explanation.
Think of it this way then: if you can explain a phenomenon by a potential adversary as either a conscious choice or a blunder, attributing it to a blunder is risky, because you start to assume that party is incompetent.
Don’t forget the context: I replied to a comment saying that Russia could never threaten another country because it was struggling so much in Ukraine. I don’t mean that it’s “slowly winning” to mean, “I am very confident that, without other changes, Russia will win, but it will just take many years.” I mean that Russia is advancing, able to maintain an effective fighting force and remains a real threat.
There are very real reasons to think that Ukraine’s war against Russia’s oil economy will eventually provide the pressure away from the frontline that forces Russia to capitulate. But we can’t be at all confident of this; economic collapse has, as I mentioned before, been repeatedly predicted and has not yet come to pass. That doesn’t mean it won’t, but it means that confidence about Russia’s inability to threaten violence against other states is dangerously misplaced.
Ukraine’s economy is only able to maintain its effort due to massive support from its allies. But Russia has powerful allies too: it would be a foreign policy loss for China if Russia fails; China wants the same “spheres of influence” thinking that Putin does (and Trump does) to prevail internationally.
If you want to say that Russia’s slow battlefield progress is of little importance to the war in Ukraine I’d be inclined to agree with you, but if you want to stand by the original comment that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine indicate its threats must be toothless I hope I’ve explained why I disagree.
The Russian thirst for poorly trained conscripts cannot be adequately explained by corruption and poor reporting obscuring what’s actually happening. At some point you have to accept the possibility that Putin knows what’s happening and is ok with it.
Sure, it’s possible that Russia hasn’t changed its doctrine in 3 years, but it seems unlikely. Old doctrine is obsolete on a battlefield where all movements are immediately observed and armoured vehicles are more vulnerable due to a proliferation of anti tank weapons.
But throwing cannon fodder at the guns to reveal where they are, then shooting them with something else - that never stops working as long as you have cannon fodder.
I wonder if we’re just arguing over whether this strategy is something deserving of praise, with you thinking that, since I characterise the balance favouring Russia, I think this is strategic genius? In case of that, I don’t; it’s stupid and wasteful. But it’s also working in the sense that it’s gradually pushing Ukraine back.
I’m really not sure why you feel this needs any further explanation. I’ve already covered how their doctrine is failing them, and it’s resulting in troops being pushed into the meat grinder instead. If you’re confused on some particular point, maybe try asking questions instead.
75% of battlefield kills in Ukraine are made by explosive equipped FPV suicide drones. These can attack from any position and angle, and can loiter in an area for a long time, so the notion that they’re revealing the position of enemy guns with these attacks does not hold up to the reality on the battlefield. It may be the belief of some of the commanders that that’s what they’re doing, but if so, they’re wrong.
I covered this in my first reply in this conversation. If you’re going to repeat arguments that I’ve already countered, without offering any additional counterargument or support for your claim, then I might as well try to have a debate about quantum physics with a toddler.
What you specifically said was “It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear” but then ignored the fact that Russia seems extremely willing to bear the cost it is paying.
Most FPV drone kills are not first strikes against moving troops. They are more often used to to prevent recovery of a disabled vehicle or to finish off someone who’s wounded. There is a first-hand account of this here but if you’re following the war and think back to videos you’ve seen of FPV kills you’ll probably recognise this.
Think of it this way then: if you can explain a phenomenon by a potential adversary as either a conscious choice or a blunder, attributing it to a blunder is risky, because you start to assume that party is incompetent.
Don’t forget the context: I replied to a comment saying that Russia could never threaten another country because it was struggling so much in Ukraine. I don’t mean that it’s “slowly winning” to mean, “I am very confident that, without other changes, Russia will win, but it will just take many years.” I mean that Russia is advancing, able to maintain an effective fighting force and remains a real threat.
There are very real reasons to think that Ukraine’s war against Russia’s oil economy will eventually provide the pressure away from the frontline that forces Russia to capitulate. But we can’t be at all confident of this; economic collapse has, as I mentioned before, been repeatedly predicted and has not yet come to pass. That doesn’t mean it won’t, but it means that confidence about Russia’s inability to threaten violence against other states is dangerously misplaced.
Ukraine’s economy is only able to maintain its effort due to massive support from its allies. But Russia has powerful allies too: it would be a foreign policy loss for China if Russia fails; China wants the same “spheres of influence” thinking that Putin does (and Trump does) to prevail internationally.
If you want to say that Russia’s slow battlefield progress is of little importance to the war in Ukraine I’d be inclined to agree with you, but if you want to stand by the original comment that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine indicate its threats must be toothless I hope I’ve explained why I disagree.