Barak finally returned to Israel late at night in August. Upon arriving, emails show that Barak made a phone call to Stanley Fischer, the governor of the Bank of Israel and a close friend of Ouattara from their days at the International Monetary Fund during the late 1990s.
A few days later, Barak was contacted by Jean-Baptiste Gomis, the Ivorian ambassador to Israel, bearing gifts from Côte d’Ivoire. Gomis wrote: “i seize this opportunity to ask you for a meeting to talk about your impression of your visit in Cote d Ivoire and moreover how can we move forward.” Barak visited Gomis at his home soon after.
On September 16, 2013 the details of Israel’s offer arrived in Barak’s inbox. Barak received a proposal from Aharon Ze’evi-Farkash, former head of Israeli intelligence, for a SIGINT (“signals intelligence”) organization in Côte d’Ivoire.
The document, a 13-page PDF, mapped out the complete architecture for eavesdropping on phone calls, satellites, tactical radio, and “special targets” like cyber cafés. The data streams flowed to “media processing” servers, to be reviewed by analysts, then synthesized into reports for security leaders.
SIGINT processing chain included in proposal document.
The document was authored by Farkash and Amnon Unger, who developed these systems in occupied Palestine during the two periods of Intifada between 1990 and 2005. The two men had been senior commanders in Israel’s Unit 8200 signals intelligence unit, before branching off to other roles in the military and private sector.
Ic Preliminary Proposal 1.37MB ∙ PDF file Download
Farkash reminded Barak that he was operating in a gray area by sharing planning documents with a foreign country. He wrote to Barak in Hebrew: “The document is based on experience that has been accumulated during Amnon’s and my service in the unit… I believe this meets the ‘export‑of‑knowledge’ test. I thought it appropriate to bring this to your attention.” “Export-of-knowledge” (יצוא ידע) refers to Israel’s Defense Export Control Act, which requires a license for transfer of “defense know-how,” even unclassified, exploratory material like a technical spec.
Barak replied to inform Farkash that he would “probably be in touch with the client toward the end of the month.” A few days later, Barak flew to New York where he visited Epstein, during the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Epstein had been coordinating meetings for Barak for that week.
Epstein had been helping manage Barak’s itinerary in anticipation of his visit, writing that “we should try to scheudle some people for dinners or lunches when you are here.” Epstein proposed several prominent business and political leaders: New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, British Ambassador Peter Mandelson, banker Ariane de Rothschild, and Joshua Cooper Ramo, advisor to former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
Epstein also planned a meeting for Barak with another, less famous guest—Sidi Tiémoko Touré, Chef de Cabinet for President Ouattara. Before arranging the meet, he made a phone call to Ouattara’s niece, Nina Keita, according to last month’s House Oversight release.
On September 21, Epstein sent Barak a message with Touré’s personal email address: “chief of staff of outara, he arrives tomorw, try to coordianate, i am flexible. if you decide you have time.” Barak planned to visit Epstein’s house the next morning for coffee: “Let’s talk it tomorrow.”
Emails between Epstein to Barak, September 21 and 22, 2013.
For several months, Barak’s email logs showed no further discussion of the Côte d’Ivoire plan. But Epstein’s calendars, released by Congress, show another meeting with Nina Keita on November 7, 2013—the same day UN peacekeepers launched a joint operation with Ivorian security forces to dismantle armed militias and remove illegal checkpoints. The security operation, followed by a UN Security Council meeting two weeks later, set the stage for the lifting of sanctions.
In March 2014, a piece was printed in the Israeli publication Calcalist about the pending Ivorian security deal, with glowing remarks about Barak’s business acumen and his reputation in the global defense industry. Barak gave a quote coyly denying his involvement, saying “These are private conversations, and the public has no interest in them.” Barak’s brother Avinoam emailed him a link to the story, and Barak replied, “Creative minds. HaLevay Alay,” a Hebrew saying for “I wish it were me.”
As winter turned to spring, the key players were mobilized again. Ouattara made preparations for a sweeping re-organization of the Ivorian intelligence apparatus. On April 10, 2014, he dissolved the intelligence service, Agence nationale de la stratégie et de l’intelligence (ANSI), and transferred its resources into a new body, the Coordination nationale du Renseignement (CNR).
Four days later, the UN Group of Experts issued a new recommendation to the UN Security Council to ease the arms embargo in Côte d’Ivoire and lift a decades-long ban on diamond exports. Non-lethal equipment used for maintaining “public order” no longer required notification to the UN Sanctions Committee. Barak’s wife Nili emailed Ivorian ambassador Gomis to arrange a meeting with Barak.
The UN embargoes were officially lifted on April 29, 2014. After Gomis returned to Israel from Abidjan in May, Barak’s wife invited the ambassador to G Tower for a meeting with Barak and Danny Yatom, the former head of Mossad. Gomis replied to the invitation: “I WAS IN COTE D IVOIRE LAST WEEK AND HAD A CHANCE TO TALK TO THE PRESIDENT HE IS WILLING TO TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER EHUD BARAK NOT TO ANYONE ELSE.”
Barak emailed his wife: “Just tell Danny that following their request I will meet alone first and then arrange for a trilateral meeting.” Barak and Gomis met in the afternoon on May 29, 2014, and Gomis sent Barak’s wife a thank-you note afterward:
erev tov
i would like to thank your husband for the nice meeting we had yesterday
i will report to the president
thank you again for your patience
Two weeks later, on June 13, 2014, Avigdor Liberman, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Côte d’Ivoire to sign an agreement on defense and internal security, accompanied by more than 50 businessmen, who came to evaluate prospective investments in the country. The dollar amounts of the deals conducted were not made public.
The efforts that Barak had taken with the assistance of contacts like Epstein bore fruit with this formal agreement signed between Israel and Côte d’Ivoire. But the deal was only one of several that the two men were orchestrating on behalf of Israeli interests on the continent.
On August 17, 2014, Doron Cohen emailed Barak with an update on their other endeavors in Africa: “I met the man who has some money in the bank in Africa. Very interesting and very generous offer. Let’s talk.” This time, even Barak was confused by the cryptic message. He replied: “Who is the man who has money in Africa and what does he offer[?] Catch me on the mobile to explain.”
Read more of Drop Site’s reporting on Jeffrey Epstein and Ehud Barak:
part 3